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Chapter One: Introduction 
Purpose 
This thesis examines and compares the terrorist attacks at the 1972 Munich 
Olympics and the 2013 Boston Marathon in order to assess the ongoing vulnerability to 
terrorism at international sporting events, in specific, and the global environment, in 
general. In each of these instances, terrorists took advantage of the vulnerability of large 
international sporting events and launched attacks that had both political and social 
implications. Although each attack had separate motives, results, and repercussions, both 
incidents served as crises in a rising media age and impacted public policy. This paper 
compares and contrasts the 1972 Munich Olympics and the 2013 Boston Marathon 
through theoretical analyses of Downs’ Issue Attention Cycle and Birkland’s Focusing 
Events Theory, as well as through a comparison of the crises’ dominant features. Over 
the course of the 40 years separating the events, security and emergency response 
methods have improved, as have technology, media, and information flow. Even with 
these modern techniques, however, today’s generation, as with its predecessors, still lives 
in an age of vulnerability to terrorism. The conclusion combines the analysis of the issue-
attention cycle and the potential public policy changes in accordance with the 1972 
Munich Olympics attack and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings to argue that there is 
no fool-proof prevention method to the issue of vulnerability to terrorism and that the 
global community will to continue to be vulnerable in the future.  
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Methodology  
This paper uses Anthony Downs’ Issue-Attention Cycle Theory and Thomas 
Birkland’s Focusing Event and Public Policy Theory to analyze and compare the terrorist 
attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics and the 2013 Boston Marathon. Both theories 
incorporate the idea that certain problems capture the public’s attention more than others 
and create awareness and public policy changes. Downs’ five-stage issue-attention cycle 
describes the process of how an issue captures the public’s attention only to swiftly fade 
before it is resolved. The events leading up to, during, and following the Munich 
Olympics attack and the Boston Marathon bombings clearly follow the five stages of 
Downs’ issue-attention cycle. The issue-attention cycles of the Munich Olympics terrorist 
strike and the Boston Marathon bombings underscore the problems of the United States’ 
and the global environment’s vulnerability to terrorism. Birkland’s Focusing Event and 
Public Policy Theory states that sudden, unique events that disrupt the norms of society 
possess the potential to initiate public policy changes. In his theory, Birkland defines a 
Type Two focusing event as a unique, new crisis and/or problem, whose occurrence calls 
for blame and responsibility. The second part of his theory states that the public policy 
implications of these events depend on the media attention and political reactions the 
crisis attracts. An analysis of the stages of the Munich Olympics assassinations and the 
Boston Marathon bombings in Downs’ issue-attention cycle provide evidence to define 
the crises as Birkland’s Type Two focusing events, generating widespread media 
coverage and public policy changes. Analyzing the Munich Olympics terrorist attack and 
the Boston Marathon bombings with a combination of Downs’ and Birkland’s theories 
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provide a unique way to assess the ongoing issue of the world’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, particularly at international sporting events.  
 
Databases and Sources 
The main databases used for this project were LexisNexis and EBSCO. 
LexisNexis is an online database that provides access to periodical sources, such as 
academic journals, newspapers, and magazines. EBSCO is another online database that 
offers access to e-book, e-journals, and other research databases. The periodicals chosen 
for use in this thesis are highly reputable and of international recognition. The description 
and analysis of the 1972 Munich Olympic crisis used both primary and secondary 
sources. Because the Boston Marathon crisis happened recently, there are a limited 
number of written publications on the topic. Primary documents, mainly newspaper and 
magazine articles, serve as the sources of reference.  
The secondary sources used for this project include books and studies conducted 
by experts in government, terrorist and crisis research, and crisis communication. The 
secondary sources provide reviews and conclusions of the 1972 Munich massacre from 
the time of attack and current decades. The varied sources allowed for different 
perspectives and more in-depth research and analysis of the crises.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspective 
Imagine waking up to the sound of eight gunmen bombarding a hotel room or 
crossing the finish line after the race of a lifetime only to be knocked down short by an 
unknown blast. These were the dramatic moments athletes and runners faced at the 1972 
Munich Olympics and 2013 Boston Marathon due terrorist attacks. Each of the attacks 
targeted international sporting events and highlighted the issue of vulnerability to 
terrorism throughout the global hemisphere. On September 5, 1972, the “Games of Peace 
and Joy” (Reeves, p. x) turned into the Games of Murder and Fear as a result of terrorism. 
Eight members of Black September, a Palestinian terrorist organization, infiltrated the 
Olympic Village and broke into 31 Connollystrasse, which housed Israeli athletes. The 
eight terrorists, Luttif Afif, Jamal Al-Gashey, Mohammed Safady, Afif Ahmed Hamid, 
Khalid Jawad, Ahmed Chic Thaa, Adnan Al-Gashey, and Abu Iyad, brutally attacked 
innocent Israeli athletes and took them hostage. Following a botched rescue effort by the 
German government, the incident escalated into a fatal shootout. Black September 
murdered 11 Israeli athletes and lost three men of its own in the attack. The Israeli 
casualties were Amitzur Shapira, Kehat Shor, Andrew Sptizer, Jacov Springer, Moshe 
Weinbert, Yossef Gutfreund, David Berger, Zeev Friedman, Eliezer Halfin, Yossef 
Romano, and Mark Slavin. The attack violated public belief that such an iconic event was 
immune to terrorism.  
On April 15, 2013, the heightened emotions of 20,000 marathon runners, over 
500,000 spectators, and millions of international television viewers changed from 
excitement and triumph to panic and intense fear when a celebrated tradition turned 
deadly. Two brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, exploded bombs near the finish 
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line of the 117
th
 Boston Marathon in an act of terrorism. The blast left eight people dead 
and hundreds of others injured (Levs & Plott, 2013). Once again, the world was left in a 
state of crisis, as terrorists attacked a symbolic sporting event. Due to their settings and 
lasting effects, these crises serve as two of the most prominent examples of terrorism in 
history.  
According to Dr. Grant Wardlaw (1982), an expert research criminologist at the 
Australian National University and author of Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and 
Countermeasures, the origins of terrorism date back to the eighteenth century during the 
French Revolution. The 1798 Dictionnaire of the Academie Francaise, a French 
dictionary, defined terrorism as, “abuse with criminal implications” (Wardlaw, p. 18). 
Since then, the general public uses the term “to denote almost every imaginable form of 
violence . . .” (Wardlaw, p. 18). The nature of terrorism has evolved with the 
modernization and innovation of organizations and tactics. In his work, Wardlaw (1982) 
defines modern political terrorism as,  
“the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting 
for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to 
create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than 
the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to 
the political demands of the perpetrators” (p. 16).  
 
Since the 1700s, terrorism has developed into the preferred method for exacting revenge 
upon and making statements to political enemies. In their quest for political power, 
terrorists use violent tactics to induce fear in widespread audiences and to demonstrate 
their power and ability to wreak havoc on the lives of innocent people. The 1972 Munich 
Olympic attack and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings support Wardlaw’s modern 
definition of terrorism. Black September and the Tsarnaevs targeted large groups of 
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innocent people in order to communicate political messages. Black September attacked 
Olympic athletes as part of their violent political campaign against Israel. The Tsarnaevs, 
born in Chechnya, home to many extremists, harmed runners and spectators at a 
celebrated event in an effort to wreak havoc for personal revenge and to exploit American 
vulnerability to attack.  
As the methods of terrorism become more violent and complex, 
counterintelligence agencies work to develop prevention and response plans that limit 
their effectiveness. Despite these efforts, the number of political terrorist attacks has 
continuously increased since the 1970s. A 1980 report on international terrorism, released 
by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, documented 6,714 incidents between 
1968 and 1980 (Wardlaw, 1982). According to the “Global Terrorism Index Report” 
(2012), international terrorism increased in prevalence and overall global impact from 
2002-2011, with over 4,700 attacks in 2011 alone. Over the ten-year period of the study, 
global terrorism increased 464%, with attacks averaging a 93% success rate. These 
numbers correlate with the increased number of terrorist organizations and the evolution 
of global networks. As described in the United States Central Intelligence Agency’s 
“National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” (2003), 
“The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by 
modern technology and characterized by loose inter- connectivity both within and 
between groups. In this environment, terrorists work together in funding, sharing 
intelligence, training, logistics, planning, and executing attacks. Terrorist groups 
with objectives in one country or region can draw strength and support from 
groups in other countries or regions” (p. 8). 
 
 According to the strategy, the global environment enhances the vulnerability to terrorism 
as it provides more settings and opportunities for groups to attack and to network. These 
coordinated efforts result in wider, more devastating attacks. In his work, Wardlaw 
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(1982) cited the argument of B.M. Jenkins, an expert in terrorist research and current 
senior adviser at the RAND Corporation, as to what adds to vulnerability is the fact that 
“[International terrorism] makes the world its battlefield: it recognizes no boundaries to 
the conflict, no neutral nations” (Jenkins qtd. in Wardlaw, p. 45). Despite superior efforts, 
no nation can isolate itself from terrorism. Due to the unpredictability of the phenomena, 
everyone has an equal chance of being targeted. Global networks allow terrorists to 
transcend literal and moral boundaries around the world. As a result, the targets and the 
effects of terrorism become more widespread.  
In addition to the development of global networks, the rise of the digital age and 
technological advancements contribute to the ongoing vulnerability. As Brian Jackson 
(2013), Director of the Safety and Justice Program at RAND, pointed out in “The 
Olympics and Terrorism: Why the Games Remain an Appealing Target,” “the internet 
provides a forum for terrorists’ chatter and musings to be made public, and often reported 
broadly.” The advancements of internet/digital aid and technology enhance terrorists’ 
interest and successful execution of attacks. The ability to broadcast their actions across 
multiple outlets provides increased impetus to attack. The international appeal and media 
coverage of sporting events offer an especially enticing setting for terrorists. From the 
Olympics to the Boston Marathon, international sporting events evoke feelings of 
celebration, unity and togetherness. The inclusive spirit brings friends and foes together 
on a platform of peace. Yet, it is this same spirit, positivity, and attention that attract 
terrorists. Today, sporting events continue to remain vulnerable to terrorism, as they 
provide ideal settings and opportunities for organizations and governments to send far-
reaching political messages.  
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Even though they had their differences, both the Munich Olympics and the 
Boston Marathon attacks had clear objectives, and each party knew its desired results and 
long-term outcomes of its actions. Although attacks can appear random and spontaneous, 
terrorists spend a considerable amount of time and resources to plan an effective strike. 
As Wardlaw (1982) described, “Terrorism has objectives, a point which is often obscured 
by the fact that, to the observer, terrorist acts are random and directed at killing those 
whose deaths can be of no value to the terrorist cause” (p. 17). The attacks in Munich and 
Boston were not random acts of violence, but rather well-thought out and executed acts 
of terrorism designed to create perpetual fear and panic among the general public and to 
send a political message to individual nations. Due to the suddenness of some attacks, the 
public often renders terrorism as an impulsive act. Terrorists, however, plan attacks well 
in advance with definitive motivations and goals in mind. Black September targeted a 
group of people that were directly associated with the political struggle its nation was a 
part of. The Palestinians’ motivation came from a desire for revenge and recognition. 
According to Abu-Iyad, a leader of Black September and the mastermind behind the 
attack at Munich, the Palestinian’s three goals were, “’to present the existence of the 
Palestinian people to the whole world, whether they like it or not’ . . . ‘to secure the 
release of 200 Palestinian fighters locked in Israeli jails’ . . . ‘to use the unprecedented 
number of media outlets in one city to display the Palestinian struggle – for better or for 
worse” (qtd. in Klein, p. 34). The Palestinian terrorists had three clear objectives for their 
attack and took advantage of a vulnerable setting to employ a method that achieved all 
three.  
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Due to the recency of the crisis, not all of the details or motives behind the Boston 
Marathon bombings have been discovered. Although the bombings came as random to 
the general public, the brothers planned them in advance. In fact, the terrorists plotted 
future attacks as well. From what details Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the surviving bomber, has 
shared, the attacks stemmed from the brothers’ extremist beliefs and resentment. The 
Tsarnaevs, as native Chechens, felt animosity towards the United States. They intended 
to send a message that America is not an exception to vulnerability and attack. The 
Tsarnaevs not only used the attack to make a political stand for Chechens but also to 
strike against the United States’ image of freedom and safety. The attack exposed the 
United States’ vulnerability to terrorism and permanently stained an event of celebration 
and unification. The brothers placed the bomb in a location that would hurt the most 
people. The two people who died and the hundreds of others who suffered injuries may 
not have had value to the overall terrorist cause, but the strike sent a message that anyone, 
at any time, can be attacked. The bombings left a dark mark on the 2013 Boston 
Marathon, just as the ones engineered by Black September forever tarnished the Olympic 
Games.  
According to Dr. Fishman (2013), former chair of Boston College’s 
Communications Department and crisis communication expert, the three characteristics 
of a crisis are the element of surprise, a high threat to important values, and a short 
response time. The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 5, 1972 and April 15, 
2013 fall into the category of crisis events. The hostage strike and the bombings came as 
surprises on days of international sporting competition and celebration. The Munich 
massacre threatened the international values of peace, prosperity, and integrity. The crisis 
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called for an immediate response in order to safely resolve the hostage situation and 
restore the image of the Olympic Games. Similarly, the Boston Marathon attack 
threatened the American values of freedom, public safety, and patriotism and required a 
quick response time in order to limit the damage, to find those responsible, and to keep 
the public calm and informed. The terrorist attacks in Munich and Boston theoretically 
define crises and serve as models for future crises at international sporting events.  
Anthony Downs, a crisis communication theorist, explained the nature of a crisis 
through five stages. Downs’ Issue-Attention Cycle Theory outlines a crisis, such as a 
terrorist attack, in an organized, step-by-step process. The crisis starts with a pre-
problem, advances to alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm, moves to the 
realization of the cost of significant progress, gradually declines from intense public 
interest, and then ultimately arrives at the post-problem stage. Downs’ Issue-Attention 
Cycle offers an effective way to outline and to critically analyze the terrorist attacks in 
Munich and Boston. The crises are better understood, evaluated, and compared by a 
theoretical analysis of their respected stages.  
Another theorist, Thomas Birkland, categorized crisis events, such as the Boston 
Marathon, into Type One and Type Two focusing events. According to Birkland (1997), 
a focusing event is a sudden, unexpected occurrence that upsets norms and possesses the 
potential to influence public policy. Type One focusing events are naturally occurring 
disasters that are seen as acts of God (Fishman, 2013). Type Two focusing events are 
unique, new crises and/or problems, whose occurrence calls for blame and responsibility. 
The public policy implications of these events depend on the media attention and political 
reactions the crisis attracts. The Munich Olympic terrorist attack and the Boston 
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Marathon bombings issue-attention cycles help to define the crises as Type Two focusing 
events with potential public policy changes in regards to the issue of  international 
vulnerability to terrorism.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the two major events, discusses previous 
research on the topic, and introduces the two theorists, Downs and Birkland, I will be 
using to analyze the crises.  In Chapter Three, I will use Downs and Birkland to examine 
the Munich Crisis.  In Chapter Four, I will use these theorists to explain the Boston 
Marathon. In both cases, I will utilize a similar format to discuss the stages of the crisis 
and why each incident became a focusing event. In Chapter 5, I will compare the findings 
of each theoretical analysis to draw conclusions that add new dialogue to the discussion 
on the issue of vulnerability to terrorism.  
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Chapter 3: Black September’s 1972 Munich Olympics Attack 
 
Downs’ Stages of the Issue-Attention Cycle 
 
Pre-Problem Stage 
The first stage in Downs’ (1971) issue-attention cycle is the pre-problem, in 
which “some highly undesirable social condition exists but has not yet captured much 
public attention, even though some experts or interest groups may already be alarmed by 
it”  (p. 39). The pre-problem stage of the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist breaks down 
into two main issues: the development and prevalence of terrorism and terrorist 
organizations at the time and the International Olympic Committee’s and German 
government’s preparations for the Olympics. The two pre-problems contributed to one 
massive crisis.  
 
The Development of Terrorist Organizations and Prevalence of Terrorism 
 
The conflict between Israel and Palestine has a long, turbulent history. The main 
struggle began after World War II, when Jews were awarded the land of Israel. Since 
then, the Israelis and Palestinians have been involved in intense violence and warfare. In 
1967, a fight along the borders of Israel, known as the Six Day War, escalated the 
conflict. Over the course of six days, Israel defeated the Arab states at the Egyptian, 
Syrian, and Jordanian borders (Ensalaco, 2008). The defeat came as an embarrassing 
blow to the Arab states and triggered even more resentment towards the Israelis. In 
Middle Eastern Terrorism, Mark Ensalaco (2008), a Political Science professor and 
director of human rights research at the University of Dayton, observed, “The 
contemporary era of terror began after Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in 1967, an 
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event that radicalized the Palestinian national liberation movement” (p. 2). A 
demoralizing Arab defeat along the three major fronts of Israel sparked the modern age of 
terrorism. The Six Day War served as an impetus for the development of an organized 
Palestinian resistance movement, heavily reliant on terrorism, under the leadership of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  
Black September, the Palestinian terrorist organization responsible for the 1972 
Munich attacks, became an extension of the PLO in 1970. The Palestinian resistance 
movement established the group following a brutal defeat to its Jordanian “allies” in 
September of 1970 and named it “Black September” as a means to remember and to 
promote revenge for the crippling actions that had occurred (Ensalaco, 2008). Black 
September performed its first terrorist strike on November 28, 1971. The group publicly 
assassinated Wasfi Tel, Prime Minister of Jordan, in the lobby of a hotel (Ensalaco, 
2008). After the completion of its first mission, Black September followed up the 
campaign with its first “terrorist spectacular” (Reeve, p. 71), a hijacking operation in 
Europe. Members of Black September hijacked a plane destined for Tel Aviv that was 
filled with a majority of Israeli passengers. The goal of the operation was to take the 
passengers as hostages and use them to make an exchange for Palestinian prisoners in 
Israel, (Ensalaco, 2008). Although the operation ultimately failed, Black September made 
its first direct strike on Israelis and sent a message that its attempts would only grow in 
size and violence in the near future.  
The year 1972 witnessed the elevation of Black September onto the main stage of 
international terrorism. The group launched its first attack in 1971 but did not procure 
attention and recognition until its 1972 campaigns, which included a hijacking, a second 
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assassination, and attacks on European natural gas plants and petroleum refineries 
(Ensalaco, 2008). In the months leading up to the Olympics, Black September picked up 
its campaign, creating an uncertain and unsafe environment. The surge of Palestinian 
terrorist attacks, which heavily targeted Israelis, signaled the potential for an attack at the 
upcoming Games.  
 
Preparation for the Olympics  
 
The second part of the pre-problem consisted of the International Olympic 
Committee’s and the German government’s preparations for the Games. The 
International Olympic Committee denied Palestine’s request to participate in the 1972 
Games. Although Palestinian authorities outwardly expressed frustration and feelings of 
unfairness, the International Olympic Committee did not prepare for Palestinian 
retaliation or a strike at the Games (Ensalaco, 2008). However, West Germany had 
already been the target of Palestinian terrorist attacks in the recent past. The PFLP, 
another Palestinian terrorist organization, and Black September had previously launched 
attacks on Israelis in West Germany, including one in Munich (Ensalaco, 2008). In 
Middle Eastern Terrorism, Reeve observed, “It was amid this period of rampaging 
Palestinian terrorism that Israel prepared to send its athletes to the Olympics in Munich” 
(p. 39). West German officials and the International Olympic Committee, preoccupied 
with ensuring an image of “Peace and Joy,” failed to address the previous successful 
attacks on West German soil as precursors for a future one on its grand stage.  
The Germans committed themselves to ensuring the event would live up to the 
title of “The Games of Peace and Joy.” Hosting its first Olympics since Nazi rule and 
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genocide, the Germans wanted to project an image of peace and prosperity, at the cost of 
the Games’ safety and security. The 1972 Munich Olympics were to be the largest and 
most attended Games in history, with 10,490 athletes participating (Reeve, 2000). The 
size of the Games, in combination with the invention of new satellite technology for live 
broadcast, made it “the mass-media event of the century” (Reeve, p. x).  Despite these 
facts, the Germans spent only $2 million on security. Leading up to the Olympics, Israeli 
officials questioned the insufficient amount of security and the unsafe position Israeli’s 
first-floor apartments in the Olympic Village. The International Olympic Committee 
denied Israel’s request for a personal security detail in order for increased protection of 
its athletes. Ironically, other nations under less threat, such as the United States, were able 
to provide their own security in addition to what was already in place (Groussard, 1975). 
Prior to the Games, the Israeli officials asked for extra protection for their athletes, but 
the International Olympic Committee and the German government denied what could 
have been moves that deterred the attack.  
Another part of Down’s first stage in the issue-Attention cycle regards 
conversation among experts about the possible threat or issue. In the case of the Munich 
Olympics, Israeli officials and the International Olympic Committee failed to heed expert 
advice on the high threat of attack. Prior to the 1972 Games, Dr. Georg Sieber, a West 
German forensic psychologist, produced 26 worst-case scenarios for security officials. 
After studying the major terrorist organizations and tactics of terrorism at the time, Sieber 
laid out 26 different possible ways terrorists could target the Olympic village, stadiums, 
spectator areas, and the city of Munich (Wolff, 2003). His Situation 21 eerily 
foreshadowed the events that took place on September 5, 1972. As explained in 
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Alexander Wolff’s 2002 Sports Illustrated article, “When the Terror Began,” Sieber 
gave, 
“the following particulars: At 5:00 one morning, a dozen armed Palestinians 
would scale the perimeter fence of the Village. They would invade the building 
that housed the Israeli delegation, kill a hostage or two, then demand the release 
of prisoners held in Israeli jails and a plane to fly to some Arab capital. Even if 
the Palestinians failed to liberate their comrades, Sieber predicted, they would 
‘turn the Games into a political demonstration’ and would be ‘prepared to die.... 
On no account can they be expected to surrender’”(Sieber qtd. in Wolff).  
  
As it happened, his predictions turned into reality. Sieber credited his expertise in 
psychology in allowing him to place himself in the minds of Palestinian terrorists and to 
generate a plan that would satisfy their M.O. (Wolff, 2002).  
As evidenced by the events leading up to the Games, the rise in international 
terrorism and the lack of proper security measures increased the vulnerability to attack at 
the 1972 Munich Olympics.  
 
Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm 
  
The second stage of Downs’ (1972) issue-attention cycle, alarmed discovery and 
euphoric enthusiasm, occurs as “the public suddenly becomes both aware of and alarmed 
about the evils of a particular problem . . . [but exhibits] euphoric enthusiasm about 
society’s ability to ‘solve this problem’ or ‘do something effective’ within a relatively 
short time” (p. 39). It is the stage in which a crisis event occurs and brings the problem to 
the center of public attention. The discovery stage of the Munich attack revealed that 
political conflicts transcend the involved parties’ boundaries and pose a threat to hope 
and optimism. Consequently, when the conflicts enter the international arena, they 
negatively impact the lives of innocent, uninvolved parties.  In the year preceding the 
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Munich Olympics, the world witnessed the Palestinian/Israeli conflict intensify from afar. 
As the conflict became increasingly violent and more widespread, international officials 
remained uninvolved and held out hopeful beliefs for a peaceful resolution, especially 
with the Olympics approaching. In his work, Reeve (2008) described the optimistic 
feeling leading up to the 1972 Olympics, “To many of those watching the Games, it 
seemed that amid increasing international tension sport offered the only chance of sanity, 
a means of communicating with international enemies on an individual human level” (p. 
xii). With the increase in terrorism and violence worldwide, the Olympic Games offered 
a chance for nations to come together in peace in an atmosphere of celebration and 
harmony. Prior to the Opening Ceremonies, Andrew Spitzer, one of the Israeli athletes 
participating in the 1972 Games, stated, “The idea of the Olympics . . . is the fact that you 
can forget that you’re two nations, or two warring nations, and you can come together in 
sport, and through sport find the good in each other and make friendships, forge 
relationships, and find brotherhood with each other . . .” (qtd. in Reeve, p. 51). Spitzer’s 
words reflect the positive and harmonious aspirations for the Munich Games. Instead, 
Black September violated these optimistic beliefs and goals and took advantage of an 
international sporting event to advance a national political conflict. They exploited the 
naivety of the public and demonstrated that a celebratory and internationally inclusive 
event could be used as a platform for political violence. As Reeve (2008) concluded in 
his work, “The image of a family of nations competing together away from politics was 
exposed as fallacy” (p. 245). The strike revealed that vulnerability to terrorism crossed 
boundaries, specifically in political conflict, and encompassed a larger body of 
uninvolved nations and citizens.   
 18 
Another detail of this stage involves the media’s role in discovery and attention. 
Media coverage generates and enhances interest in the crisis at this stage of the issue-
attention cycle. The 1972 Olympics were the first Games showcased on live television. 
Consequently, the live broadcast and video allowed the media to air and report every 
minute detail of the attack, from the hostage stage to the gunfight. Although “The press 
had only sparse details . . . everyone there knew it was a critical moment in history: a 
terrorist attack at the Olympic Games? . . . Reports of the attack began leading television 
and radio news broadcasts around the world” (Reeve, p. 17). The disturbing details and 
images entered the minds of millions of viewers around the world. Due to the excess 
coverage and the media’s altered presentation of the events, “. . . the entire Munich crisis 
was played out like a real-life soap opera on television screens across the globe” (Reeve, 
p. 69).  The video footage and photos shown in the media overly dramatized the situation 
and led viewers to make false assumptions about the crisis. The media played an 
influential role in spreading not only the news of the attack but also the public fear and 
alarm that followed. Citizens of all nations not only became aware of the intensity of the 
conflict between Palestine and Israel but also the impact that political crises can have in 
the international sphere. Black September proved that no setting or event was off limits 
and that everyone was vulnerable to their attacks. They gave no immunity to innocent 
people or sacred occasions.   
When the public sees hope for a peaceful resolution, the second stage of Downs’ 
issue-attention cycle transitions from alarmed discovery to euphoric enthusiasm. The 
euphoric enthusiasm stage of the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attacks had a limited 
scope in terms of an optimistic resolution. At the Olympics, euphoric enthusiasm peaked 
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when media outlets erroneously reported that all of the hostages had been saved. The 
news brought false hope and security to the families of the Israeli athletes and sparked a 
phony sense of relief for the international public. Conrad Ahlers, the press secretary and 
official spokesman for the German Federal Government, further deepened the false hope 
with his public statement that the hostages had been saved. He diminished the severity of 
the situation and increased enthusiasm of a peaceful future with his comment, “I think 
[the attack] will be forgotten after a few weeks” (qtd. in Reeve, p. 129). Ahlers’ statement 
exhibited the lack of communication among government officials and overall ignorance 
of German officials and the International Olympics Committee on the severity of the 
incident.   
 After the media corrected the report and relayed the news of the 11 Israeli 
casualties, the public returned to a state of panic and alarm. Hope for a peaceful 
resolution disappeared. While Israelis were hopeful the German government would take 
care of the situation, they also knew that their own response would be one of revenge that 
would lead to more violence. The Black September attacks revealed the depth of the 
political conflict and the merciless lengths the sides were willing to go in order to achieve 
their political goals. For Black September and the Israeli terror response team, the only 
optimistic end involved the elimination of the enemy.  
In the international sphere, the euphoric enthusiasm stemmed from the responses 
of the United Nations and governments of global powers, such as the United States and 
Great Britain. If they were to get involved, the general public believed in the guarantee of 
a peaceful resolution. From the general public’s perspective, international leaders would 
not allow their citizens to be subjected to the risks associated with Black September and 
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other related terrorist organizations. The public leaned on the shoulders of international 
leaders to resolve the now international crisis and enthusiastically believed in the 
attainment of this goal.   
In the aftermath of the attack, feelings of alarm transitioned to limited optimism. 
The discovery of the depth and severity of the Isreli/Palestinian conflict limited the 
euphoric enthusiasm of the public. While the Israelis and Palestinians looked to violence 
as means for resolution, the general public still held out hope for peace.  
 
Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress 
Downs’ (1972) third stage of the issue-attention cycle, realizing the cost of 
significant progress, comes as the public recognizes that solving the problem will not 
only cost money but also will require major sacrifices. Because of the multiple 
independent groups involved in the crisis, this stage includes several different realizations 
and definitions of progress. The International Olympic Committee, the Germans, and the 
Israeli leaders all had different agendas when it came to progress.  
In the initial stages of the crisis, the International Olympic Committee refused to 
let the cost of progress impact the Games. On the day of the attack, the International 
Olympic Committee did not meet until 7 p.m. to discuss the crisis, 14 hours after Black 
September took the hostages. When the committee finally met, Avery Brundage, the IOC 
President, publicly declared, “The Games must go on” (qtd. in Reeve, p. 96). His 
declaration exemplified the ignorant attitude the IOC had towards the severity of the 
issue and its refusal to let political conflict ruin the image of the Munich Games. The 
International Olympic Committee suspended the Games on September 5, only to reopen 
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them the next day. The officials selfishly believed in the realization that stopping the 
competition would take away from their efforts to hold a successful Olympic Games. The 
International Olympic Committee, in the midst of the attack, stayed focused on keeping 
the Olympic spirit and built a façade of continuous “peace and joy” by remaining 
ignorant to the situation at hand.  
For the International Olympic Committee, significant long-term progress involved 
stricter security measures and restoring the image and meaning of the Olympic Games. 
The costs would come at the expense of international participation and spectator ease and 
enjoyment. Charles Bierbauer (1996), former CNN Senior Washington Correspondent, 
perfectly described the costs of this progress, “In great measure, it has been since 1972 
that the general public has submitted to security searches in airports, arenas and other 
public events - and learned to live with the threat of terrorism.” Since 1972, participants, 
spectators, media members, and all other attendees at Olympic Games and other 
international sporting events have been subjected to full-body inspections, metal 
detection, bag checks, and identification verification upon entrance. All serve as 
inconvenient but necessary measures of security in the era of terrorism.  
Up until the 1972 Olympics, the host country planned and financed all of the 
safety and security measures. The crisis in Munich, due in large part to the unorganized 
and lack of security personnel, caused the International Olympic Committee to establish 
strict criteria for security at future Games. In 1972, the German’s had a $2 million budget 
for security. (“Political Aspects of the Olympic Games”). In 1976, just four years later, 
Montreal spent over $100 million on security alone. In addition, Olympic officials now 
had to consider the current international political issues in progress and the political and 
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social environments of potential host cities (“Political Aspects of the Olympic Games”). 
They had to take into account the implications of inviting nations in political conflict and 
the danger posed to the involved and uninvolved countries’ athletes. The costs associated 
with preventing terrorism at future Olympics not only involved technology and personnel 
but also political awareness and intelligence.  
For the Germans, enhanced preparation, organization, and communication defined 
progress. During the crisis, German government and security officials appeared 
unorganized, unprepared, and understaffed. Prior to the Games, the officials designated 
the handling of all affairs to the Bavarian government, rather than the federal 
government. This action served as the main facilitator of the chaotic crisis response. 
Federal officials were unable to send in troops, level orders, or take any progressive 
action due to the policies granting the Bavarian government full control over any issue. 
The Bavarian government refused the help of the federal government, as well as Sayert 
Matkal, Israel’s professional counterterrorism response team. Officials believed that the 
efforts of these groups would complicate the rescue mission and implicate West Germany 
into the political conflict. The costs of utilizing external aid outweighed the benefits, so 
the Bavarian government continued the rescue effort on its own.  In the aftermath of the 
Games, the Germans adjusted their policies of federal government involvement and 
established a counterterrorist unit of their own, known as the GS-9. The nation believed 
the assembly of the GS-9 would not only prevent a future attack at home but also help to 
deter international terrorism, as well. Additionally, Downs’ third stage (1972) states that 
the public considers the use and advancement of technology as the best solution to nearly 
all crises. Accordingly, the military equipped GS-9 with all modern warfare and 
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intelligence technology, thus enabling them to make significant progress in the arena of 
terrorism.  
For Israelis, the cost of significant progress meant more sacrifice, violence, and 
fear. The Israeli response was one of retaliation and revenge. Significant progress for 
them meant eliminating those responsible for the Olympic attacks. The main cost 
comprised of civilian lives and sacrifice. In their case, however, the Israelis were willing 
to incur these costs. The Israeli government organized and funded a secret terrorist 
organization to eliminate members of Black September and the PLO. Dubbed 
“Committee X,” the organization, which comprised of senior Israeli politicians and 
officials, designed an assassination campaign (Reeve, 2000). General Aharon Yariv, the 
overseer of the campaign, stated “Operation Wrath of God,” the plan’s unofficial title, 
“‘went back to the biblical maxim of an eye for an eye’” (qtd. in Reeve, p. 161). The 
Israelis answered violence with more violence. The assassination campaign 
recommended the use of any kind of terror tactic necessary to destroy the enemy, 
wherever and whenever (Reeve, 2000). For the Israelis, the benefits of significant 
progress, eliminating the enemy, outweighed the costs, jeopardizing human lives.  
As indicated by their responses, the groups involved in the crisis had individual 
notions for progress. While the International Olympic Committee and the German 
government focused on enhancing security, the Israelis concentrated on plotting revenge. 
The costs associated with these goals varied in significance. Ensuring safety at future 
Olympics came with financial and social costs. Designing a counterterrorist organization 
consisted of political and technological costs. Engaging in violence included moral and 
individual costs. The willingness of the groups to incur these costs associated with 
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significant progress, especially in the case of the Israelis, led the general public to lose 
interest in the crisis.  
 
Gradual Decline of Intense Public Interest 
 In the fourth stage of the issue-attention cycle, Downs (1972) described “a 
gradual decline in the intensity of public interest in the problem” (p. 40) occurs as people 
either become discouraged, threatened, or bored with the issue at hand. People start to 
turn their focus to other issues to no longer deal with or to suppress concerns regarding 
the current problem. In the aftermath of the Munich crisis, the main decline came in the 
form of the decreasing public interest in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Additionally, new 
international conflicts arose, such as the energy crisis and spread of Communism, that 
funneled attention away from the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The public shifted their 
efforts away from the escalating violence in the Middle East and towards more optimistic 
issues, such as solving the world’s oil problems and halting the spread of Communism in 
Southeast Asia. The 1972 Munich Olympics attack had put the Palestinian/Israeli conflict 
at the center of international attention. However, as Israelis responded to the violence 
with more of their own, people began to turn away from the bloodshed and to let the two 
sides settle the matter in the absence of international involvement. The constant violence 
deterred public interest and international involvement. In Middle Eastern Terrorism, 
Ensalaco’s explanation of the overall conflict and responses revealed why the public’s 
interest declined. Ensalaco (2008) stated, “The waste of innocent life marked the Arab-
Israeli conflict from the beginning. Palestinian terrorists found justification for killing 
innocent Israelis, Israeli soldiers rationalized the deaths of innocent Palestinians as 
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collateral damage” (p. 48). Ensalaco’s description of the violent nature of the conflict 
demonstrated the reasoning behind the public’s desire to remain neutral in the situation. 
Although the Black September attack proved that local political conflict can disrupt 
international peace, the public looked to stay out of the political affairs of the Middle East 
and move on from the crisis. The public and the International Olympic Committee did 
just that in 1976 when Montreal hosted the XXI Olympic Games. Despite its own 
controversies, the Montreal Olympics attempted to restore the peaceful image and 
atmosphere of the event and to avoid any connection or reminder of the past tragedy. The 
public took the chance to revel in the cheerful, competitive spirit of the Olympics, rather 
than to dwell on the past or worry about the present political issues. They put the image 
of the Munich Games in the past and replaced them with ones of celebrations in 
Montreal.  
 
The Post-Problem Stage 
 
 The final stage in Downs’ issue-attention cycle occurs as the problem moves from 
“the center of public concern . . . into a prolonged limbo . . .” (Downs, p. 40). The 
problem remains unsolved, yet stays in the backs of the minds of the public. International 
crises, like the 1972 Munich Olympics, become symbols for comparisons to similar 
occurrences in the future. As time progressed, the public’s interests shifted toward other 
crises, but once the 1976 Olympics came around, the public was reminded of the 
tragedies that occurred and the potential threat of another attack. The international 
sporting event was and is just as vulnerable to attack now as in the past. The 1972 
Munich Olympics presented the potential dangers associated with hosting international 
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events and assembling large international audiences. Additionally, the 1972 Olympics 
provided significant contributions to the considerations and preparations for future 
Olympics. In his review, Reeve (2008) pointed out the long-term effect of the Munich 
Games, stating, “Yet the 1972 Black September attack is impossible to ignore. It was a 
turning point in world sport; never again would it be possible to separate major sporting 
events from politics” (p. 245). Prior to 1972, conversations leading up to the Olympics 
focused on the athletes competing and the honor associated with hosting the Games. In 
contrast, as a result of Black September’s successful campaign, vulnerability and the 
level of threat become the main issues. Every two years, the Winter and Summer 
Olympics arrive, surrounded by conversations of political conflict, terrorist threats, and 
public safety. The host country enters the international center stage under enhanced 
scrutiny. The country’s political ties and issues enter the mainstream media. News 
coverage exposes every minute detail of the preparation and the potential risks of the 
event. For example, media coverage and conversations leading up to the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics focused on Russia’s political conflicts and the violent environment of nearby 
areas. News reports constantly mentioned the hostile nature of Russia and its government 
and made it seem as if the threat of terrorism had never been higher. Due to crises, such 
as Munich, discussions preceding the Games now highlight the heightened security 
measures and the risks associated with hosting the Games in the midst of current 
domestic and international political conflicts. 
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Birkland’s Focusing Event Theory 
 
Type-Two Focusing Event 
   
 Thomas Birkland’s theory (1997) describes focusing events as “sudden, 
unpredictable events . . . [that] influence the public-policy process” (p. 1). Birkland 
classified focusing events into two categories: normal and new. Crises categorized as 
normal focusing events have occurred before and are actuarially predictable. New 
focusing events are those that have never occurred before or occurred in the distant past 
(Fishman, 2013). The 1972 Munich Olympic terrorist strike fits Birkland’s description of 
a new focusing event. Black September’s assault at the Munich Olympics served as the 
first large-scale terrorist attack at an international sporting event. After 1972, the focus of 
the International Olympics Committee shifted from efforts of peace and joy to efforts of 
maximizing security due to the constant threat of terrorism. The Black September attack 
“create[d] uncertainty and unpredictability” (Fishman, p.2) not only in the immediate 
moment but also in the future. Athletes, spectators, and international officials did not 
know whether to expect another attack. The event sparked an international study into 
terrorism and potential plots to limit the chances of a future occurrence. No matter how 
strong these efforts were, no one could reverse the constant feelings of uncertainty and 
unpredictability Black September created and extended over all future Olympics and 
international sporting events.  
According to Birkland (1997), type two focusing events also lead the public to 
search for blame and responsibility. During and after the Munich attack, Olympic and 
Israeli officials, the Israeli athletes’ families, and the general public spread blame and 
responsibility among different parties. The Israeli government blamed the Palestinian 
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Liberation Organization for the direct attack, but it placed responsibility for the 
inefficient response and the fatal outcome on the German government. Upon gaining 
word of the attack, the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, charged the German 
government with the task of solving the hostage situation. Meir refused to concede to the 
demands of Black September and relayed a message to German officials, writing, “The 
responsibility of the crisis falls on West Germany. The Israeli government expects the 
West German to do all in its power to secure the release of the hostages . . . Israel hereby 
pledges its trust in West Germany . . .” (qtd. in Reeve, p.55). Because the attack occurred 
on German soil, Meir and the Israeli government had no choice but to leave the situation 
in the hands of the West German government and hope that it ensured the safety of its 
athletes and citizens. The West Germans’ lack of preparation and experience, however, 
dashed any hope of a peaceful resolution. German officers, who were onsite at the time, 
stated that as time progressed, “It was obvious to all the officials that the Palestinians 
were in total control of the situation” (qtd. in Reeve, p. 48). Witness accounts and studies 
of the German security preparation and response support the Israeli government’s 
placement of at least partial blame and responsibility on the German government. From 
the outset, German efforts to solve the hostage situation lacked organization and 
leadership. Aaron Klein (2007), author of Striking Back and a former Israeli intelligence 
officer and a correspondent in Time magazine's Jerusalem bureau, furthered this 
observational opinion, stating, “The Federal Republic of Germany had no hostage 
negotiation team, and the men seemed lost, adrift, lacking in ideas, yet unwilling to 
accept advice” (p. 52). The West German government claimed full-range authority 
despite the fact that it did not have the plans or the resources to be the sole actor. Because 
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of the intense focus on presenting “The Games of Peace and Joy,” the German 
government and security officials were unprepared for an attack of such a degree. With a 
$2 million on security budget, the German government employed just 25,000 security 
officials for their disposal (Groussard, 1975). They dispatched 2,000 undercover, 
unarmed police officers in Olympic Village. These men patrolled the grounds with a 
walkie-talkie to serve as their only weapon. In regards to this futile effort, Klein (2007) 
remarked, “German authorities were well equipped to deal with unruly men and copious 
quantities of beer, but were utterly unprepared for a terrorist attack” (p. 26) and “the men 
at [German] disposal were novices, entirely lacking experience in counterterrorist 
maneuvers” (p. 65). The Germans complicated, rather than reduced, the stress and 
severity of the attack with their inexperience and ill-equipped security team and 
counterterrorist action.  
In the years following the 1972 attack, German officials openly admitted to their 
faults in preparedness, training, and overall security efforts. Manfred Schreiber, the 
Munich police chief in 1972, acknowledged, “‘Our police force was totally unprepared 
for a terrorist attack of this kind’” (Schreiber qtd. in Reeve, p. 227). Heinz Hohensinn, a 
German police officer at the time, went even further in his disclosure, “‘Our training at 
that time regarding terrorism was absolutely insufficient if existent at all. Today both 
training and equipment are at a completely different level’” (Hohensinn qtd. in Reeve, p. 
234). Although blame for the direct attack falls upon Black September, a large level of 
responsibility for the ensuing massacre and poor handling of the situation fell upon the 
German government and security personnel.  
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As defined by Birkland (1997), a focusing event points out the flaws in certain 
political and societal systems. As a result, government officials and the public address the 
need to change with new and/or modified public policies. The 1972 Munich Olympic 
attack identified flaws in security, communication systems, and global and domestic 
counterterrorist strategies. In order to improve counterterrorism, domestic and 
international governments continue to alter policies and agencies connected to the issue. 
In Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Countermeasures, Wardlaw (1982) 
suggested 15 policy options as part of anti-terrorist campaign, a few of which Germany, 
Israel, and the United Nations implemented. One called for governments to, “Establish a 
‘third force’ or special military units to cope with terrorist attacks. The decision to 
employ new types of force involves policy decisions about how early to commit military 
forces, the role of police in anti-terrorist operations, and civil-military relations” (p. 67). 
Following Black September’s assault in Munich, the German government established the 
GSG-9, an official state counterterrorism group. Ironically, German officials worked with 
Israeli counterterrorist directors to organize the agency (Klein, 2007). Additionally, the 
Israeli government set up an Overseas Terrorism Unit within its national security 
department. According to Lieutenant Colonel Mor of Israel, “‘The massacre at Munich 
helped us understand that we would have to deal with a new subject that we had never 
before encountered – terror attacks against Israeli targets abroad’” (qtd. in Klein, p. 99). 
Mor’s words go along with Birkland’s theory that a focusing event identifies the flaws 
and need for change in certain areas of policy, in this instance, Israeli counterterrorism. 
As a result of the 1972 Munich attack, Germany and Israel added to their counterterrorist 
policies and agencies. 
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Another one of Wardlaw’s (1982) counterterrorism proposals addressed security 
issues. The proposition necessitated an, “Increase [in] the size and powers of the security 
forces” (p. 67). The most glaring problem at the 1972 Munich Olympics was the lack of 
security. The members of Black September entered the Olympic Village without 
encountering any police officers (Klein, 2007). According to official documentation, “No 
armed guards or police were positioned in the Olympic Village or at stadium entrances” 
(Klein, p. 26). The absence of police presence and the underwhelming number of security 
officials in general significantly contributed to Black September’s success. In the 
aftermath of the attack, the International Olympic Committee established stricter criteria 
for security. Since the 1972 Games, there have been twice as many security officials as 
athletes and staff present at every Olympics (Klein, 2007). During the preparation stages 
of all Games, security now came tops the list of the International Olympic Committee’s 
concerns.  
In addition, the 1972 Munich attack and other terrorist strikes in the decade 
sparked a movement to create international legislation on terrorism. In order to limit the 
threat of terrorists, Wardlaw (1982) suggested, “a policy of no deals or concessions to 
terrorists’ political demands” (p. 70). Both Israel and the United States employ this 
policy, but international officials and members of the United Nations remain skeptical of 
adopting such extreme measures (p.71). At Munich, Germany conceded to Black 
September’s demands and gave them full control over the situation, despite specific 
instruction from the Israeli government not to adhere to those demands. Germany faced 
political pressure to obey the demands in order to save the hostages and to end the 
situation as quickly as possible. The International Olympic Committee, as well as internal 
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agents, also pressured the German government to save the face of the international 
sporting event (Reeve, 2000). Had a stricter policy regarding counterterrorism been in 
effect, the outcome of the crisis may have been different. Even today, international 
organizations continue to argue and disagree over legislation regarding terrorism.  
Black September’s successful terrorist campaign at the 1972 Munich Olympics 
sparked international dialogue on policy in regards to security and counterterrorism. The 
new public policies implemented as a result of the attack increased security measures 
worldwide and led to the creation of national counterterrorist units. International 
organizations continue to deal with public policy issues regarding terrorism today.  
 
The Media and Political Phases 
Birkland’s (1972) two phases of focusing event politics consist of the response of 
the news media and the impact it has on the long-term reactions and attitudes of policy 
makers. In the first phase, media attention, the amount of coverage is directly correlated 
to the scope, damage, and rarity of the event. Prior to the Black September, the Olympics 
had already been labeled “the mass media event of the century” (Reeve, p. x). Over 4,000 
news reporters and media personnel roamed the Olympic grounds. As the first live-
broadcast international sporting event, the Munich Olympics received an overwhelming 
amount of media coverage. When the attack occurred, the media took advantage of its 
large presence and widespread audience to broadcast every moment of the crisis. The 
crisis received additional coverage because of the attack’s symbolic social and political 
nature. The rarity associated with this attack and its consequences sparked increased 
media coverage during the initial stages and immediate aftermath.  
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In addition, the extent to which an event satisfies the main characteristics of news 
determines the amount of coverage it receives. The central features of news consist of 
timeliness, unusualness, prominence, proximity and impact (Evans, 2008). The Munich 
Olympics crisis fulfilled each of the criteria to warrant extensive media exposure. The 
attack took place at an iconic, internationally attended event. As a result, it physically and 
emotionally impacted not only those directly involved but also people around the world. 
Black September executed the first large-scale act of terrorism at an international sporting 
event and exposed the high level of vulnerability to attack at these affairs. The political 
implications of the terrorist attack enlarged the scope and resulting damage of the issue. 
Black September launched an attack against innocent citizens of its political enemy and 
sent a strong message that their political efforts would stop at nothing. The group’s use of 
a celebrated tradition as a platform for terrorism shocked and appalled people worldwide. 
The consequences and discoveries the crisis brought about forever transformed the nature 
of media coverage and sporting events.  
The extensive impact and prominence of the crisis increased policy-makers 
incentive to implement change. The media served as an influence and a target of the long-
term reactions and attitudes of policy makers. Following the Munich Olympics, the main 
issues debated and in need of modification in the international arena were 
counterterrorism efforts and media regulation. As a result of the attack, international 
policy makers issued stricter laws on security and monitoring. In addition, international 
and domestic officials in Israel and Germany worked together to implement policy 
changes on counterterrorist agencies and their authority in Munich-like situations. 
Additionally, the crisis called attention to the impact and reach of the media. International 
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officials realized the need for media regulation in the midst of technological advancement 
and additional media outlets. According to Wardlaw (1982), the two primary concerns of 
law enforcement in regards to media and terrorism included: “(1) reporting of terrorist 
violence is excessive, sensational, and sometimes unbalanced . . . (2) newsgathering 
practices hinder the effective management of terrorist incidents . . .” (p. 78). News 
reporters priorities consist of developing elaborate details to stories in order to create 
interesting broadcasts, rather than focusing on the facts of the event. The broadcasts, as in 
the case of the 1972 Munich Olympics, provide insider information to the public and 
compromise the crisis response and rescue efforts of law enforcement. In Munich, 
German security guards secretly surrounded 31 Connollystrasse in an attempt to rescue 
hostages only to have their cover blown by a live broadcast of their movements, which 
was seen by Palestinian terrorists inside the building (Reeve, p. 88-89). The German law 
enforcement immediately aborted the rescue attempt. The media’s excessive coverage of 
the crisis directly hindered the effectiveness of the rescue mission.  
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Chapter 4: 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings 
Downs’ Stages of the Issue Attention Cycle 
Pre-Problem Stage 
The pre-problem stage of Downs’ (1971) issue-attention cycle consists of the 
realization that “some highly undesirable social condition exists but has not yet captured 
much public attention, even though some experts or interest groups may already be 
alarmed by it”  (p. 39). The “undesirable social condition” leading up to the Boston 
Marathon bombings was the United States’ ongoing vulnerability to terrorism. The events 
of 9/11 demonstrated the United States’ vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Following that 
day in 2001, talks of possible attacks have swirled around the media but with no 
immediacy or actual threats mentioned. Boston has been the target of terrorist attacks in 
the past. Two of the flights that hijacked on 9/11 flew out of Boston Logan International 
Airport. The city of Boston “is as sensitive as any in the United States about the danger of 
terrorism attacks” (Irvine, 2013). Hosting the second largest, single-day sporting event of 
the year, with over 25,000 participants and 500,000 spectators, year after year, only adds 
to Boston’s vulnerability (Halpern, 2013).  
Another aspect of Downs’ first stage is a discussion of the condition among 
experts but not in the public sphere. In the case of the Boston Marathon bombings, this 
stage played out in the previous criminal investigations of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the 
bombers. In 2011, Russian officials warned the United States of the of the possible 
terrorist involvement and potential threat posed by Tamerlan Tsarnaev. According to 
United States Representative Peter King (R) of New York, however, the FBI 
investigation of Tsarnaev followed the familiar pattern “‘where the FBI is given 
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information about someone being a potential terrorist . . . they look at them, and then they 
don’t take action, and then [those individuals] go out and commit murders’” (qtd. in 
Knickerbocker, 2013). United States officials, experts in the field, engaged in 
conversation about the existing problems, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and a potential terrorist 
attack, but the issues never came to the public eye until the actual attack took place.  
According to Edwards (2013), communication between intelligence agencies has 
been an ongoing issue. Prior to the attacks, the senate commission discovered an 
unevenness in information sharing across defense agencies in the United States. Members 
of the United States Senate, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department 
of Government Affairs, experts in the field, engaged in discussions on how to correct the 
problem, but it did not become a topic of immediacy and importance until public reports 
leaked on previous investigations of Tamerlan Tsarnaev immediately after the bombings 
occurred.  
The bombings, combined with public media reports of previous investigations of 
Tsarnaev, and the lack of communication/cooperation between the United States’ 
intelligence agencies, brought the problem of vulnerability to terrorism to the forefront of 
public concern. The crisis transitioned from the pre-problem stage to the second stage, 
alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm.  
 
Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm  
The crisis event takes place during the second stage of Downs’ (1972) issue-
attention cycle and results in the public’s alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm 
“about the evils of a particular problem . . . [and] society’s ability to ‘solve this problem’ 
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or ‘do something effective’ within a relatively short time” (p. 39). The crisis comes the 
center of public and media attention, which promotes awareness and interest in the 
ensuing issues. When the two bombs exploded at the finish line of the Boston Marathon, 
the scene became one of pandemonium, confusion, and fear. As described by 
eyewitnesses in Levs and Plott (2013), “The terrorist attack . . . triggered widespread 
screaming and chaos . . . .” People at the scene ran in every which direction; people at 
home panicked about their loved ones in the area. The country entered a state of alarm, as 
major questions were left unanswered: who was responsible, what actually happened, and 
were there going to be more bombs. Terrorists had capitalized on the event, the city, and 
the country’s vulnerability to attack.  
Within minutes of the bombings, television coverage and social media flooded the 
public with videos, pictures, and eye-witness accounts at the site of the attack. Over 1,100 
media members were on hand to cover the event (Halpern, 2013). Not only did news of 
the event rapidly spread across the United States but also across the world. The Boston 
Marathon garners enhanced media attention because of the event’s international appeal 
and involvement. Ninety different countries were represented by the near 27,000 
participants in the 2013 Boston Marathon (Halpern, 2013). International media outlets, 
such as the United Kingdom’s The Guardian and China’s Xinhua news channel, provided 
reports of the attack within the hour (Irvine, 2013). As reported by Rodrigues (2013), 
over 75% of the public obtained information on the bombings from national television 
and online news outlets. Dramatic headlines, such as “Sports festival becomes bloodbath” 
and “Carnage at Boston,” added to the international fear and alarm and brought salience 
to the vulnerability of terrorism worldwide (Irvine, 2013).  
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In the aftermath of the attack, the public’s alarm transitioned to optimism and 
hope for justice. Feelings of panic and fear remained high in the days following the 
bombings, as the suspects were still at large. When authorities identified Tamerlan and 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev as the suspects, feelings of optimism and vengeance began to replace 
worry and fright. According to Bostonian Walter Newman (Kao, 2013), “things began to 
return to normal . . . .” following the death of Tamerlan Tsarnaev and the arrest of 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The people of Boston felt safer knowing that those directly 
responsible for the fatal crisis had been caught.  
President Obama and Boston’s government officials also contributed to the 
feelings of optimism and euphoric enthusiasm for solving the problem with their public 
speeches. As described by Herman Leonard and Arnold Howitt (2013b), two crisis 
management experts, “the briefings [by officials] were factual, avoided speculation, and 
emphasised [sic] both what was known and unknown. They were presented directly, 
succinctly, and calmly.” The words, tones, and language used by officials worked to 
effectively transition the public from feelings of alarm to feeling of hope and optimism. 
In his address to the nation, President Obama stated, “Make no mistake we will get to the 
bottom of this and we will find out who did this and we will find out why they did this. 
Any responsible groups will feel the full weight of justice” (Sherwell & Swaine, 2013). 
Obama’s words increased the public’s belief that the government would take effective 
action and quickly solve the problem.  
In addition to the arrests of those responsible and the optimistic attitude of public 
officials, a majority of the euphoric enthusiasm for solving the problem came as a result 
of the city of Boston’s preparedness for a crisis and its effective, efficient response to the 
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bombings. The city of Boston and the Boston Athletic Association, which runs the 
Boston Marathon, had an emergency action plan in place in case of a crisis with such 
impact as what occurred. Boston’s emergency management personnel practiced its all-
hazards plan, which was accredited by the national emergency planning evaluation 
program (EMAP), multiple times in the past two years (Grabar, 2013). When the 
bombings occurred, emergency management personnel remained calm and executed the 
plan, clearing the area, saving lives, and bringing order to chaos.  The emergency 
response demonstrated the progress made since 9/11, but the crisis event reinforced the 
fact that no amount of preparation can prevent a crisis. The United States’ government 
and the public turned their attention to finding ways to decrease the country’s 
vulnerability to terrorist attacks and prevent a similar crisis to the Boston Marathon 
bombings. As ideas emerged, however, the public began to realize the costs of significant 
progress in the areas of security and public safety at sporting events.  
 
Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress 
The third stage of Down’s issue-attention cycle recognizes the costs and sacrifices 
associated with significant progress. Because it occurred recently, the Boston Marathon 
crisis is still fresh in the minds of Americans, but as other crises arose, such as school 
shootings and nuclear threats, the public’s attention shifted away from Boston. The 
public, the media, and the government continue to search for ways to fight against 
terrorism, especially at sporting events, but they are also focused on making progress on 
other domestic and foreign issues.  
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In preparation for the next marathon, the Boston Athletic Association and the city 
of Boston submitted proposals for enhanced security. The plans included banning all bags 
and backpacks, limiting spectator access at the finish line, and increasing police presence 
along the course. As a result of the proposals, the public realized the personal sacrifices 
and limits to significant increases in security measures and other possible solutions 
required to address the event’s and the country’s vulnerability to terrorism.  
According to Downs (1972), the development of modern technology and 
scientific progress resulted in the belief that “a technological solution is . . . to be possible 
in the case of nearly every problem” (p. 40). Technological solutions, although beneficial 
in many cases, also have their costs and limits. High technology security systems, such as 
the Next-Generation Incident Command System (NICS) used at the marathon, cost 
millions of dollars to develop and install. The NICS provides race officials and 
emergency personnel with an interactive map of the position of all runners, locations of 
water and aid stations, and the ability to mark and report any emergency (Keating, 2013). 
The technology allowed emergency officials to respond rapidly and efficiently to the 
bombings. Implementing this type of technology at all outdoor sporting events, or even 
just marathons, would come at a hefty price, and while helping the response to crises, the 
technology cannot prevent them.  
Significant progress is not only costly, but it is also limited. As much as increased 
security measures can help, the Boston Marathon bombings “emphasized that sports 
venues can never be 100 percent secure” (Keating, 2013). Sporting events, by nature, will 
always be vulnerable to attack. The marathon course provides 26.2 miles of open access 
and opportunity for attack, and with the event’s rich history and meaning, “there is no 
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foolproof method for providing complete protection and prevention” (Leonard & Howitt, 
2013). Increased security presence, crowd control, and modern security technology can 
help to decrease the chance of a crisis and/or act of terrorism, but these options cannot 
100% prevent an attack.  
Sacrifices will also have to be made by fans and spectators to couple with 
heightened security (Keating, 2013). Limiting entry and spectator positions along the 
course and prohibiting bags are progressive changes that would negatively affect crowds 
and the positive atmosphere of the event. Spectators gather to celebrate, not to be limited 
or to worry about potential crises. The presence of increased security will produce 
feelings of fear and uneasiness. Fans will have to sacrifice their piece of mind and some 
liberties to be better secured.  
 
Gradual Decline of Intense Public Interest 
As the crisis drags on or others arise, the public loses interest and turns its 
attention towards another issue. During this fourth stage, the public attempts to block out 
the negativity of the crisis. Today, the Boston Marathon crisis continues to transition 
from the third to the fourth stage as the public replaces its negative memories and 
emotions with optimistic feelings for next year. People now look to the 118
th
 Boston 
Marathon as a way to memorialize those who died and to demonstrate the strength of not 
only the city of Boston but also all of the runners and spectators. The crisis event is so 
recent, however, that it still holds the public’s attention, and when the event arrives next 
April, the public will be reminded of the terror that struck.  
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The crisis’s transition from the third to fourth stage has been delayed by the court 
proceedings of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. With reports of his trial still headlining local and 
national news, the issue possesses a significant amount public interest. Once the decision 
is handed down, interest in the event will decrease at a quicker pace. Feelings of 
vulnerability will be lessened once Tsarnaev has been sentenced for his crimes, and the 
public will attempt to move on from the terror that Tsarnaev caused. As the public 
suppresses the memories of the Boston Marathon bombings and the media turns to 
another crisis, the event and the issue of the United States’ vulnerability to terrorism will 
enter Downs’ post-problem stage.  
 
The Post-Problem Stage 
A crisis reaches the final stage in Downs’ issue-attention cycle when it falls from 
the center of public attention and enters a state of prolonged limbo (Downs, p. 40). 
Although the problem may go unsolved, it remain in the backs of the minds of the public. 
Because the Boston Marathon bombings occurred so recently, the event still holds public 
attention, but as time passes, the event will eventually enter the post-problem stage. The 
programs and the policies established to increase security and safety will continue to have 
an impact on the public, but public concern for the issue of vulnerability to terrorism and 
the event itself will weaken (Downs, 1972). The issue will continuously exit and reenter 
the state of  “prolonged limbo” (Downs, p. 40), as the public will be reminded of the 
crisis every April when the Boston Marathon arrives. As much as the public would like to 
suppress the memories of the fatal attack, the Boston Marathon and the issue of 
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vulnerability to terrorism will recapture the public’s attention on a yearly basis, as all 
eyes turn to Boston.  
The Boston Marathon bombings may fade from public attention, but the crisis 
event will still serve as a symbol of the United States’ vulnerability to terrorist attacks. In 
the event of a future terrorist attack, this event will be re-evaluated and brought up in 
comparison. The Boston Marathon bombings will be attached to any future attack at a 
sporting event. The United States will always be vulnerable to terrorism, and threats will 
continue to arise. The Boston Marathon bombings will occupy a position in the issue-
attention cycle of any future event relating to the problem of the country’s vulnerability 
to terrorism.  
 
Birkland’s Theory of Focusing Events 
Type Two Focusing Event 
Through examination and analysis of the Boston Marathon bombings’ issue-
attention cycle, one can conclude that the event can be classified as a focusing event. 
Thomas Birkland (1997) described focusing events as “sudden, unpredictable events . . . 
[that] influence the public-policy process” (p. 1). The Boston Marathon bombings came 
as a surprise, caused harm and widespread panic, and churned conversation for public 
policy changes. The characteristics of the Boston Marathon bombings highlighted in the 
stages of its issue-attention cycle correspond with Birkland’s Type Two (new) focusing 
event. The bombings “violate[d] expectations, upset norms, and create[d] uncertainty and 
unpredictability” (Fishman, p. 2). Questions about public safety, security, and 
government intelligence communication immediately surfaced. The problem sparked 
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uncertainty about the safety of any public event and our country as a whole, as well as the 
occurrence of a future attack. The crisis initiated a new attitude toward the country’s 
vulnerability to terrorism and new standards for emergency preparation and response.  
Another characteristic of Birkland’s Type Two focusing event is the search for 
blame and responsibility. In contrast to natural disasters, which are seen as acts of god, 
Type Two focusing events trigger a search for a guilty party (Fishman, 2013). 
Immediately following the arrests of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the Boston 
bombers, reports of previous terrorists investigations of Tamerlan flooded news and 
media outlets. Following the lead of influential politicians, the public began to place 
blame on United States’ intelligence agencies and their failure to communicate and share 
information of the investigations and the potential terrorist threat across governmental 
departments. Members of the United States’ Congress “are demanding to know why 
America’s top law enforcement agency did not keep closer tables on Tamerlan Tsarnaev” 
(Washington, 2013), after multiple warnings of his link to Russian extremists. 
Government officials criticized the FBI’s handling of investigations into the allegations 
of Tamerlan Tsarvaev’s connection to terrorist organizations. The public criticisms 
shifted blame towards the United States’ intelligence committees. Congressmen, such as 
Dana Rohrabacher, stated their beliefs that had the FBI taken stronger action, the Boston 
Marathon bombings could have been prevented (Herszenhorn, 2013). Although the 
Tsarvaevs’ carried out the act, the public and the political spheres searched for internal 
resources of blame and responsibility.  
 Additionally, Birkland’s literature emphasizes a focusing event’s potential to 
influence public policy. A crisis, such as the Boston Marathon bombings, commands so 
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much public attention that it has implications in the political sphere. A focusing event 
points out the flaws in certain systems and/or the need for change in others. This, in turn, 
leads to the call for changes in public policy regarding these specific areas (Fishman, 
2013). As previously stated, the Boston Marathon bombings revealed flaws in the 
communication system between national intelligence agencies and governmental 
departments. Government officials placed blame on intelligence agents, stating they had 
the means to prevent the attack. The government has since proposed policy changes in 
regards to communication and information sharing. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Boston Marathon bombings, the FBI changed its policy on information sharing and 
terrorist investigations. Under the new policy, all federal case agents will be informed of 
persons of interest in terrorist investigations and the person’s whereabouts. Previously, 
only one to two case agents received information about and/or knew the whereabouts of 
the persons of interest (Schmidt, 2013). The Boston Marathon bombings had direct policy 
implications in the political sphere.  
The Boston Marathon also brought to light the United States’ vulnerability to 
terrorism and the limitations to outright prevention of such attacks. The Boston Marathon 
is celebration of history, tradition, and the accomplishments of thousands of runners. The 
last thing on the minds of those in attendance, apart from security and emergency 
personnel, was the possibility of a terror strike. Spectators and participants were 
immersed in feelings of pride and jubilation. When the bombs exploded at the finish line, 
the eyes of not only United States’ citizens, but also those worldwide, shifted to Boston 
and the realization that no event is an exception from the threat of terrorism. In addition, 
the public realized that no matter how great the preparation, no event can 100% protect 
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itself from attack. The city of Boston implemented and practiced a highly accredited 
emergency action plan leading up to the marathon (Grabar, 2013). The bombings showed 
that even the most prepared and efficient plans cannot prevent or solve the issue of 
terrorism. This realization promoted discussion about public policy changes in the areas 
of security and crowd sourcing at public events, specifically marathons. Proposals 
include implementing the use of high technology bomb sensors, restricting public access 
to certain areas along race routes, and increasing security presence along the routes 
(Leonard & Howitt, 2013). Each proposal reduces the chance of another event like the 
Boston Marathon bombings but cannot fully prevent one.  
The nature of the Boston Marathon attack, as a focusing event, poses difficulty to 
implementing effective policy changes. The event identified the country’s vulnerability to 
terrorism but complicated the normal process of public policy changes that follows Type 
Two focusing events. The Boston Marathon has had implications on public policy, but 
the process remains ongoing.  
 
The Media and Political Phases 
The response of the news media and the long-term reactions and attitudes of 
policy makers make up the second part Birkland’s focusing event theory. The media 
response to a crisis event depends on its scope, impact, and damage, immediate and long-
term. Examining the issue-attention cycle of the Boston Marathon bombings, specifically 
the alarmed discovery stage, one can see that the characteristics of the public sporting 
event and the crisis sparked widespread media coverage. The international scope of the 
event, along with the randomness and fatal damage of the attacks, attracted media 
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attention from Boston to Beijing. The extensive media coverage, from any and every 
outlet, intensified public attention and generated increased conversation for 
counterterrorism in the public and political sphere.  
In his remarks on the relationship between media and terrorism, Wardlaw (1982) 
argued, “The media must adopt a more specifically ethical stance and must attempt to 
evolve sensible and workable self-control mechanisms” (p. 86), especially in terrorist 
reports. Thirty-one years later, the media’s response to the Boston Marathon attack 
heeded Wardlaw’s advice. Public relations firms advised clients to cutoff all social media 
flow and to refuse to comment on the events at hand. Actions such as these helped to 
decrease rumor circulation. Although the details of event were simultaneously 
broadcasted across all media platforms, the regulations associated with the outcome of 
the Munich Olympics played a role in mitigating the media effects on the crisis. Long-
term reactions and attitudes of public policy makers remained focused on safety and 
security issues rather than problems with the media. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 A theoretical analysis of each attack using Down’s Issue-Attention Cycle Theory 
and Birkland’s Focusing Event Theory provides a basis of comparison for the events. The 
organization, execution, and aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympics and 2013 Boston 
Marathon terrorist attacks differed, but the events, despite being forty years apart, 
ultimately expose the same reality: the world will always be vulnerable to terrorism. 
Technological advancements, heightened security measures, and counterterrorism units 
provide increased terrorist prevention and response methods, but none are foolproof. As 
prepared as the city of Boston was for an attack, the emergency management and terrorist 
prevention measures did not thwart the Tsarnaevs’ assault on the Boston Marathon. 
Although each crisis has its unique features and preceding factors, the theoretical 
analyses identify many similarities in their social and political implications that add to the 
dialogue of vulnerability to attack.  
 
Social Implications 
 The social implications of the two crises reveal the roles the sporting events and 
the media play in adding to vulnerability and incentivizing terrorism. Although no setting 
or event can be one hundred percent safe, the 1972 and 2013 attacks serve as two of the 
most prominent examples of the increased vulnerability to terrorism and violence at 
international sporting events. Black September and the Tsarnaev brothers took advantage 
of heavily attended, widely broadcasted, and extremely meaningful sports traditions. In 
Middle Eastern Terrorism, Reeve (2000) asserted, “[The Olympics] offered the 
Palestinians a showcase where they could bring their grievance to the millions watching 
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on television around the world” (p. 60). The international popularity and attention on the 
event provided increased incentive for terrorists to attack. This assertion also applies to 
the Boston Marathon and the Tsarnaevs’ attack as well. Influenced by extremist beliefs, 
the Tsarnaevs took advantage of a highly populated and broadcasted event to display 
their attack on the American values of freedom and public safety. In both instances, the 
presence of mass media and viewership increased the incentive for an attack. Sporting 
events attract international media attention and offer a variety of tactical options.  
 Both the 1972 and 2013 attacks demonstrated that terrorists will stop at nothing in 
order to carry out their mission. Terrorists disregard all moral boundaries in pursuit of 
their goals. Although performed forty years apart, the attacks of 1972 and 2013 
exemplify the ongoing threat of terrorism and its continuous use as a means to achieve 
political objectives and to make political statements. In each of these instances, the 
attackers crossed moral boundaries. Black September and the Tsarnaev brothers targeted 
innocent people and international values and traditions. While Black September 
murdered 11 blameless Israeli Olympic athletes, the Tsarvaevs’ killed seven unsuspecting 
marathon spectators and injured hundreds of other runners and bystanders. Additionally, 
both parties carried out attacks on iconic events. The Olympics represent international 
sportsmanship, peace, and cooperation. The Boston Marathon symbolizes an international 
tradition and falls on a day that recognizes American independence and its founding 
values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The terrorists attempted to put a 
permanent stain on these events and what they stand for.  
 In terms of social implications, the 1972 Munich attack and the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombings exposed the increased, and at times negative, role and reach of the 
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media in crises events. Between 1972 and 2013, the world evolved into a digital and 
constantly connected age. With the developments of modern technology, information 
flows quickly and extensively. Social media and television allow news to travel across 
the globe instantaneously. A major effect of this digital age and widespread access is the 
role of the media in terror events. Media outlets provide a way for terrorists to create 
spectacles of their work and showcase their strength to a global audience. In Political 
Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Countermeasures, Dr. Grant Wardlaw (1982) argued 
that the world has entered an era in which, “Television terrorists can no more do without 
the media than the media can resist the terror-event” (p. 76). In an era of television 
terrorists, the media serves as an agent, playing the roles of exhibitor and messenger. The 
media broadcasted both the 1972 Munich Olympics and the 2013 Boston Marathon 
across multiple platforms worldwide. At the time, the Munich Olympics was the most 
widely covered event in history, drawing one billion viewers in over 100 countries and 
hosting over 4,000 journalists and other media members (Reeve, 2008). The continuous 
coverage allows for viewers to witness all aspects of an event, positive and negative. It 
also increases the risk of false information flow and digitally altered images. All of these 
factors contribute to the media’s increased influential role in terrorism.  
The media not only provides a platform for terrorists to broadcast their attacks, 
but it also serves as a hindrance to terror response and public well-being. According to 
Wardlaw (1982), “Competition between media organisations seems to heighten the 
necessity to focus on the emotion-generating as opposed to the purely informational 
aspects of news reporting” (p. 76). The media’s focus on breaking a story and 
broadcasting attention-grabbing, as opposed to informative, news negatively impacts the 
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quality and accuracy of the information it provides. The flow of rumors and 
misinformation from the media played influential roles in both the 1972 and 2013 attacks. 
Misinformation from media in Munich led people to falsely believe all hostages survived 
and the crisis was solved quietly and peacefully. In reality, the opposite occurred, as the 
outcome was a scene of chaos and death. Similarly, the first reports on the Boston 
Marathon blamed the smoke and loud noises on a celebratory cannon. This report was 
followed up by one that the event was not an act of terrorism but instead the work of a 
few domestic citizens trying to gain attention. Not until reports of fatalities and an 
address by government officials was it confirmed to be an act of terrorism. In addition, 
several reports of other terrorist attacks in the city of Boston that day caused citizens 
more unnecessary stress, fear, and anxiety. For example, a report linking a fire at the JFK 
library to terrorists led Bostonians and fellow Americans to believe that another strike 
could come at any time, anywhere, due to the distance between the rumored strikes.  
The social implications of the crises regard the legacy of sporting events and the 
role of the media. Due to their reach and popularity, athletic competitions and their media 
coverage provide incentives for attack. Iconic sporting events, such as the Olympics, hold 
deep meaning and draw large audiences. The media adds to the attention with its global, 
instantaneous broadcasts and sensationalized-focus. The combination adds to society’s 
vulnerability to terrorism.   
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Political Implications 
The political implications of these crises and the vulnerability they revealed affect 
the government, prevention efforts, and the growth of terrorism. After a devastating 
crisis, society’s ensuing action centers on placing blame and responsibility, frequently at 
the government’s expense. Humans tend to be overly optimistic at times of crisis and 
expect the government to be infallible, placing “the burden of defense . . .  
increasingly . . . upon local government, the private sector, and the individual citizen” 
(Jenkins qtd. in Wardlaw, p. 58). The public leans on the government as a sense of safety, 
protection, and mostly hope. Crises, such as the Munich Olympics and the Boston 
Marathon, expose the global environment’s vulnerability to terrorism and increase the 
fear and anxiety associated with the threat of attack. In the aftermath of the 1972 Munich 
Olympics and 2013 Boston Marathon crises, experts, national and international officials, 
and the public put blame and responsibility on the governments of Germany and the 
United States, respectively. Israelis and Americans expected more from the governments, 
international and domestic, in terms of crisis prevention, preparation, and response. In 
Munich, multiple governments played roles preparing for and responding to the attack. 
The Israeli government was at fault for failing to heed the advice and warnings of 
security and psychology experts regarding the increased threat Israeli athletes and the 
event at large were exposed to in Munich. The German government’s botched attempt at 
resolving Black September’s assault at Munich earned them blame and public outrage. In 
the case of the United States, the government’s preventative measures and emergency 
response initially resonated well with the public. Reports of failed intelligence and lack of 
communication among government agencies regarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s connections 
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to extremist organizations, however, shifted the public’s view. People came to believe the 
attack could have been prevented had government agencies cooperated with each other 
and shared information on the actions and threat of Tsarnaev. In the moment, the 
governments of Germany, Israel, and the United States acted how they believed was best 
fit for the situation. The public can pose questions of “what if” or “why not this” forever, 
but governmental crisis prevention and response measures continue to stand little chance 
of eliminating vulnerability.  
From a theoretical perspective, terrorism defines the term crisis, as it “shocks, 
upsets norms, and produces change to public policy” (Fishman, p. 8). Attacks 
immediately subject victims to times of crisis and set off a cycle of events. Terrorist 
attacks are violent crises with far-reaching effects and no end or easy solution in sight. 
Not only does terrorism theoretically define a crisis, but it also leads to the analysis of 
another key crisis: vulnerability to attack. Following a terrorist attack, counterterrorism 
and prevention experts search for explanations as to how the attack occurred under the 
current circumstances. They review the overall prevention plans, security measures, 
response drills, and emergency management personnel involved in the process. In most 
cases, experts’ conclusions lead to the same result: vulnerability is a factor that cannot be 
eliminated or predicted. Wardlaw (1982) concluded from his research on political 
terrorism, “a well-engineered [terror] campaign will engender a continuous, high level of 
anxiety because the threat is vague, unpredictable, and incomprehensible” (p. 35). Each 
terrorist attack increases the fear of the public, especially that associated with the 
increased awareness of vulnerability and the chances of an ensuing strike. Law 
enforcement and counterterrorist intelligence agencies spend countless hours and 
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resources designing and employing prevention plans prior to highly attended, well-
publicized affairs, such as international sporting events. Their efforts go wasted in the 
occurrence of a successful attack, exposing the unsolvable nature of vulnerability. The 
characteristics of the events, such as large crowds, widespread media attention, and 
symbolic meaning, render the occasions increasingly vulnerable to attack, even with 
enhanced security and prevention methods. Terrorists execute in a continuous cycle of 
surprise, fear, and innovation. If one tactic is prevented, another is developed. For 
example, after the 1972 Munich Olympics, airports worldwide enhanced security and 
screening processes. In the years immediately following these changes, hijacking, as a 
form of international terrorism, decreased, dropping from an average of 15 incidents/year 
to five incidents/year. As anti-terrorist efforts deterred hijackers, they opened the way for 
alternative tactics. The use of explosives and bombings increased from an average of 
150/year prior to 1972, to an average of 230 incidents/year from 1974-1980, while the 
use of assassination and hostage-barricades also increased by about 150% over the same 
time period (Mickolus, 1983). The enhanced focus and prevention of one method, led to 
the added use of others. The statistics go to show that prevention methods can be 
effective in deterring terrorist tactics, but the alternatives still leave events, governments, 
cities, etc. in a state of constant vulnerability.  
Following the 1972 Munich Olympics, Black September entered the center stage 
of global terrorism and continued to execute terrorist attacks on Israelis, Jordanians, and 
other Arab nations. Their success and innovative tactics sparked the formation of new 
terrorist organization worldwide. The rise of groups, such as Al Queda, came with 
negative consequences and has “mutated [terrorism] from spectacle to atrocity” 
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(Ensalaco, p. 1). Since the 1972 Munich attack, terror strikes have become more 
prevalent, violent, and fatal. Black September set the precedent for violent spectacles at 
international events; modern terrorist groups built upon and escalated the group’s 
“conservative” version of terrorism. Although Black September dissolved in 1973, the 
group set the tone for the emergence of international terrorism and brought about a new 
era of terror and fear. In effect, “The secular Palestinian terror organizations . . . 
constructed a network that facilitated terror operations in Europe, North Africa, and Asia 
as well as the Middle East through the 1970s and well into the 1980s” (Ensalaco, p. 264), 
which set the stage for the emergence of multiple international terrorist organizations. 
Muslim terrorist organizations, under the leadership of Bin Laden, created a network 
from Chechnya to Indonesia (Ensalaco, 2008). The formation of these organizations, 
along with the advancements of modern weaponry and technology, give way to increased 
vulnerability to attack. The combination provides new and increased tactics, sources of 
information, and settings for terrorist groups to take advantage of. The Munich crisis 
demonstrated the vulnerable nature of international sporting events to terrorism and 
violence, as well as prompted the realization that anyone and anywhere can be subject to 
attack.  
 
The Reality of Vulnerability 
The social and political implications of the crises expose the vulnerable 
environment of modern society. International sporting events, some of society’s longest 
traditions, are ideal targets for terrorists. Governmental efforts to limit terrorism only 
increase vulnerability as prevention methods led to the invention of new tactics and 
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organizations. The global network that terrorists work within enables increased 
communication and larger-scale campaigns. While government and international 
agencies attempt to decrease vulnerability, terrorists simultaneously find ways to keep it 
constant.  
Prior to the 2004 Sydney Olympics, Alex Gilady, an Israeli member of the 
International Olympic Committee, put vulnerability in perspective, stating, “You can’t 
prepare for everything . . . When you’re at the barn, you don’t believe the horse will run 
away until it runs away” (qtd. in Wolff, 2002). Vulnerability is a concept that cannot be 
avoided, no matter the strength of prevention methods or preparation. By employing 
extensive preventative measures, security officials set out to limit their event’s 
vulnerability. Although an event may not seem susceptible to vulnerability, it still 
possesses a certain level that becomes exposed when a threat or an attack occurs. The city 
of Boston prepared and practiced emergency action plans to decrease the chances of a 
successful attack. In addition to the advanced prevention methods employed at the site, 
the marathon was the last event people thought terrorists would attack. The Tsarnaevs’ 
bombings at the finish line, however, exposed the vulnerability of the event and again 
highlighted the issue’s unpreventable nature.  
Due to the number of terrorist methods and organizations, vulnerability cannot be 
eliminated. An event, building, or any site is left vulnerable because of the extensiveness 
of modern terrorism. With modern technology and intelligence, one would assume that 
vulnerability to attack has decreased. The success rate of terrorism, however, contradicts 
this assumption. The increasing number of effective strikes cancels out the increasing 
level of preparedness and prevention. Each successful attack demonstrates the constant 
 57 
level of vulnerability to terrorism. The work of emergency management personnel, 
counterterrorist units, national governments, and international organizations to prevent 
and to thwart terrorist plots can decrease the likelihood of the use of certain methods, but 
it cannot eliminate all of the possibilities, which leaves vulnerability constant. As 
prepared as an individual event, city, or nation may be, its efforts can only go so far in 
preventing an attack. No matter how many hypothetical situations and possible terrorist 
plots experts generate and assess, vulnerability will still exist. The stark reality is that for 
every one plot identified, there exists an infinite number more.  
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